Abstract-In distribution systems, a multitude of prosumers interact among themselves in social networks and with the electricity network through a variety of information and communication technology tools. In this paper, we propose a new vision for the distribution system in which prosumers are encouraged by different balancing premiums to balance their electricity in a local community. Price-responsive generation and demand of an individual prosumer are affected by his/her attitudes and inherent characteristics. Further, the individual attitudes on benefit and comfort would evolve during social interactions. A load aggregator, on behalf of prosumers, participate the community market run by a local electricity coordinator who takes responsibilities for operational securities and uses nodal prices to guide prosumers' physical behaviors. A regulator is assumed to design balancing premiums schemes. Multi-agent based simulation with a four-layered representation is employed to study features of the community and the best incentive strategies for the desired performance.
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Nomenclatures (•)
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Utility curve and marginal utility curve of
Generation cost curve and marginal cost curve of [1] , [2] . The fast development and vast deployment of the distributed generation urge exploitation, in a large scale, of cheap and clean renewable energies. Further an increasing number of intelligent domestic appliances prompt the needs for a smarter distribution system and a corresponding new energy vision.
The emerging distribution system (EDS) is a socio-technic system [3] , [4] , characterized by the interactions between a technical infrastructure and social decisions based on different individual aspirations [5] . There are bidirectional interplays between social aspects that provide goals, expectations, "rules to play", etc., and technical structures that define physical functionalities, feasibilities and etc. To fulfill their own roles, both micro-players and macro-players involved in the emerging system make diverse decisions and react to changes of environment driven by others' actions [6] , [7] .
For a better management of smart grids, innovation concepts are propose, such as clustered based power network for managing renewable energy resources and optimizing power flow exchanges. In [8] , an energy management based on interconnected clusters of price-responsive demands is proposed to manage the energy exchanges among the clusters and the grid. In [9] , a hierarchical cluster network structure is proposed for describing and controlling fractal clusters of the smart grid to integrate different energy flows and optimize energy exchanges [10] , [11] . However, none of them addresses the impact from social behaviors and psychological characteristics of self-interested prosumers.
The behaviors of a large amount of self-interested prosumers (an entity can both produce and consume energy), pursuing individual economic benefit and comfort in the above mentioned environment, may exhibit self-organizational properties for or against the expectations from the society; therefore, their behaviors need to be guided by macro-players in terms of rules [12] , [13] . Regulation and policy makers have to, resorting to sophisticated decision making, consider the autonomous behaviors from all players and encourage active beneficial participations. A few works have been done to study relevant aspects, for example: residential behaviors are investigated to find different reactions to price incentives [14] . Reference [15] observes the feasibilities and advantages of market premiums to improve energy efficiency in the German market. Prosumers' energy sharing behaviors are studied to find flexible managements, such as the optimization of energy scheduling [16] , and the corresponding services [17] .
The challenge of understanding such emerging systems is to design an accurate while flexible model to integrate new players [18] , [19] , resources [20] , system rules, etc., as well as their interactions [21] and autonomous decisions [22] , [23] in such a dynamic complex environment.
Multi-agent system (MAS) can be employed as a technical solution to setup the needed simulation framework. The MAS is a container of networks and players, defined as agents capable of communication, and reacting to the environment changes based on their own decisions. The MAS has been successfully used in power systems such as modeling decision making in energy management [23] , dynamic process in electricity markets [24] , etc.
In this paper, we introduce a new vision for the operation of the EDS in which consumers have been transformed into prosumers. This switch makes locally available generation that can be locally exploited to match demand, with new "market" approaches and strategies to operate the distribution systems. A multitude of "active" prosumers, interact among themselves, in social networks, and with the electricity network, through a variety of ICT tools. The interactions are driven by individual psychological and social motivations (attitude on comfort, economic benefits, and social interactions among individuals...) that are evolving quickly over time. In this framework, new approaches and markets for matching demand and supply at the local level (self-organized transactions among prosumers. . . ), new roles (the local electricity coordinator. . . ) and new operational techniques (power balancing at the distribution level. . . ) and pricing schemes (nodal prices for congestion management at the distribution level. . . ) are emerging. On top of that, the regulator needs to device a set of rules, new and imaginative, to drive the system towards a desirable performance in terms of electricity affordability and market efficiency, energy efficiency and environmental sustainability.
We consider the EDS as a whole, not only focusing on one aspect as traditionally done (behaviors of consumers or network operation, or retailer market), but also providing a comprehensive framework in which the interplay of all the layers/players can be modeled. Specifically, prosumers are modelled as social-technical agents capturing physical, psychological, social and economic interactions from various players. Other macro-players, such as local electricity coordinator (LEC), load aggregator, regulator, are also modelled as agents. Individual behaviors of generation and consumption, self-organized trades and a local community market (LCM) are implemented in the proposed methodological approach through the interactions of various agents. The approach can be usefully adopted by "macro-players" (regulator, LEC, load aggregator. . . ) to test and validate "control strategies", based on the control variables they can decide, for achieving various performances ranging from economic affordability and efficiency, environmental and energy sustainability, through nudging and incentivizing a population of self-interested and autonomous prosumers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we introduce the self-sustainable community and the MAS framework for the players and their interactions. In Section III, detailed model of prosumers are given. Section IV describes macro-players' models including load aggregator, the LEC and regulator. Illustrative examples are given in Section V with a special focus on the analysis of impacts from different balancing premiums (BPs) and prosumers' inherent characteristics. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. A SIMULATION FRAMEWORK FOR SELF-SUSTAINABLE PROSUMER-BASED ENERGY COMMUNITY
A. Self-Sustainable Prosumer-Based Community
In the proposed new energy vision of self-sustainable prosumer-based community for the EDS, prosumers are incentivized to reach energy balance from near, green, economical sources or self-organized solutions through corresponding BPs set by a regulator. The balancing levels include 1) self-supply, 2) self-organized trading at the same-bus or in the same social circle, and 3) local community market (LCM).
The price and control signals are updated for every control time interval (CTI), depending on system requirement such as 15 minutes, 1-hour, 1-day, etc. A prosumer decides generation and demand for the next CTI. After self-supplying, he/she becomes a buyer/seller to balance the rest through self-organized trades (bilateral) or/and the LCM through a surrogate. The LEC, similar to a combination of DSO and a power exchange, is modeled to manage the network, including energy exchange with other communities through a higher voltage bus, solve congestions, and clear the LCM with nodal prices.
All prosumers have their own social time intervals (STI) which vary from individual to individual. After updating their attitudes on benefit and comfort, they will alter their generation and demand according to the new attitudes and the expectations on the price changes. Obviously, due to the differences of inherent stubbornness characteristics of each individual on price changes, the modification of the generation and demand are different for each prosumer even when they face the same price change. To assure the security of the network, the LEC acquires information of the self-organized trades and manages the system congestion along with the clearing of the LCM for each CTI.
B. Framework of Self-Sustainable Community Simulation
A four-layered framework integrates the social network, advanced ICT, power grids including the medium and low voltage levels and decision makings of various players in different scales (Fig. 1) .
In the social layer, a prosumer randomly decides his/her social preference at each STI: benefit-driven or comfort-driven. Then he/she finds in his/her social circle a model prosumer of the same preference, who obtained the maximum benefit or comfort from last CTI. After that, he/she adjusts his/her attitudes toward those of the model prosumer.
The ICT layer provides a communication media for gathering and sending data regarding operational states, selforganized trades, the LCM results, and the current regulation regime.
In the physical layer, prosumers can inject and withdraw power into/from the network. The self-organized cross-bus trades are subject to the wheeling charge. Similarly, traditional generators and loads are also connected into this layer. The operational security of this layer is responsibility of the LEC.
The decision making layer is a virtual and private place for players to analyze and valid information from the ICT layer, and then react based on individual objectives and constraints.
C. Multi-Agents Simulation Structure
In the proposed EDS of our paper, the balance is greatly encouraged, at the distribution level, within the community through the participation of the self-interested prosumers. It can mitigate the up-stream grids in terms of managerial duties and power flow issues, consequently defer new investments. The only possible way to achieve this goal is to use effective signals (such as economic, cultural. . . ) to nudge the behavior of each prosumer towards the desired direction, which collectively decides the performance of the system. The control proposed in this paper aligns the objectives of prosumers and macro-players so that the generated economic signals can be effectively used to induce the behaviors of prosumers.
The simulation structure (Fig. 2) contains the most typical characteristics and interactions of each player, abstracted from each layer in Fig. 1 . Players thus can be divided into two general groups: micro-players, i.e., prosumers, and macro-players, including the load aggregator, the LEC and the regulator. Macro-players set rules, monitor the entire system, gather information and issue needed signals.
Prosumers share their information of latest comfort and benefit and attitudes on them at each STI in the same social circle.
At each CTI, prosumers analyze historical prices to predict possible variations of withdrawal and injection prices. Based on the newly updated social information and economic signals from macro-players, prosumers schedule their own generation and demand, considering generation and demand limits for the next CTI. After the self-supply, the role of a prosumer is defined as a seller (generation in excess) or a buyer (generation in deficit). During the participation of the trading in each CTI, a prosumer uses a profit-not-decreasing strategy to form the final price quotation. At each CTI, self-organized negotiation for the prices and quantities among prosumers within the same social circle or at the same bus considers the BPs and the wheeling charge as well.
The load aggregator provides services on behalf of prosumers, to participate the LCM based on modified nodal prices, and also collects the information of self-organized cross-bus trades and their corresponding adjustment bids to submit to the LEC. After receiving the clearing quantities and nodal prices from the LEC, the load aggregator recalculates the withdrawal and injection prices to obtain fee for the service. The clearing quantities and modified prices are then sent back to relevant prosumers.
The LEC runs the LCM using quotations from the load aggregator, small-sized traditional generators and loads in the same community, aiming at providing the most effective incentives to induce the behaviors of the market participants towards a desired outcome (such as maximizing the community social surplus, minimizing overall losses, etc.) while respecting to operational constraints. Energy exchanges with other communities are also considered as one of the LEC's tasks. Because the LEC cannot directly control prosumers' demand and generation, he/she uses the nodal prices as economic incentives to guide prosumers' decisions on their demand and generation, leading the whole system to a desired situation.
The regulator, as the only policy making macro-player in our framework, is responsible for monitoring the operation of the market and the performances of the entire system. The "overall control" of the system therefore can only be performed by him/her through regulations.
III. MICRO-PLAYER MODELING
To make decisions for the next CTI, prosumers not only change the price-responsive generation g t k and demand d t k , sensitive to μ t k and ϕ t k which can be influenced by social interactions, but also adjust quotations based on costs and profit-not-decreasing strategies.
There are 3 strategies for prosumers to balance their demands. The first is to be self-supplied. The second is through self-organized trade among sellers and buyers in the same social circle or at the same bus. The trade would preferably be established within prosumers at the same bus to avoid costs due to the network (wheeling charge and congestion cost). The last is to trade, through the service provided by the load aggregator, in the LCM run by the LEC.
A. Self-Supply
The imbalanced energy of a prosumer can be determined by the generation g t k and demand d t k (1) . They are calculated as (2), (3), based on the reference generation and demand which represent the probable available capacity and load profile for each CTI. Constant parameters ϑ k,g ∈ [0, 1] and 
The evolution of prosumer k's individual attitudes on the benefit and comfort along time can be described by its trajectory on a normalized 2-dimensional attitude space (μ, ϕ)(μ, ϕ ∈ [0, 1]). The μ-axis signifies the attitude on economic benefit in terms of avoiding cost from consumption or maximizing earnings from generation. Likely, the ϕ-axis denotes the attitude on comfort in terms of the willingness to use appliances to satisfy his/her living standards [6] . Obviously, a prosumer concerns only the economic benefit if ϕ t k = 0: an increase in |ῡ t k | orρ t k increases the generation or decreases the demand according to (2) and (3). The magnitude of change then depends on his/her current attitude on benefit μ t k and his/her inherent characteristic ϑ k . Whereas a prosumer would not change his/her generation or demand for the sake of comfort if μ t k = 0.
For each social time interval (STI), a prosumer firstly decides his/her preference: benefit-driven (pursuing greater benefit) or comfort-driven (pursuing greater comfort). The benefit-driven (comfort-driven) prosumer then finds his/her model prosumer whose benefit (comfort) is the largest within his/her social circle. In fact, the absolute value of the benefit (comfort) is not strictly needed. Only a rank of the benefits (comfort) of the prosumers in his/her social circle is required to find the model. The rank can be generated through various methods, such as evaluation, conjecture, etc. In this paper, we simply use the absolute value of the benefit (comfort) calculated by (20) , (21) and (22) . By comparing his/her own (μ t k , ϕ t k ) with those of the model prosumer (μ t m , ϕ t m ), the prosumer's individual attitudes are updated to a new position Fig. 3 illustrates a simply case of 6 prosumers in the same social circle, with two model prosumers Mb (maximum benefit) and Mc (maximum comfort). Benefit-driven prosumers A and B move toward Mb. Comfort-driven prosumers C and D move toward Mc. Assuming prosumer Mb is still benefit-driven, he/she will not move; whereas Mc is benefit-driven now, thus he/she will move towards Mb.
B. Self-Organized Trade
A buyer b asks offering prices and quantities firstly to all sellers at the same bus, and then to a randomly selected number of sellers in his/her social circle. Thus, a list of preferential sellers is formed by (6), considering offering prices ε t s (s ∈ t b,s ), BP rewards ζ t b and unit wheeling charge t . Similarly, a seller s forms a list of preferential buyers by (7) . A transaction is successful only when buyer b and seller s are matched. The price and quantity of the transaction are agreed as in (8) and (9), respectively. To determine network related costs, the information of cross-bus transaction quantities (10), gathered by the load aggregator, should be sent to the LEC.
To decide the quotation for a transaction, a prosumer needs to consider the following two facts:
For a buyer (12): 1) the bidding price should not be higher than the marginal utility (13); and 2) the expected benefit should not be lower than the benefit obtained at time t-1 (14) .
For a seller (15): 1) the offering price should not be lower than the marginal cost (16); and 2) the expected benefit should not be lower than the benefit obtained at time t-1 (17) . 
C. Participation to the Local Community Market
If the imbalance still exists after the previous two strategies, a prosumer can resort to the LCM through the load aggregator. The price quotation is identical to (12) or (15), the quantity is calculated by (18) or (19) .
After getting the cleared quantity and price (ρ t b , υ t s ) from the load aggregator (23), the benefit B t k of prosumer k is computed by (20) or (21) depends on his/her role at time t. B t k composes benefits from three items, namely, self-supply, self-organized trade and the LCM; and the normalized comfort H t k is defined in (22) .
IV. MACRO-PLAYERS MODELING
A. Load Aggregator
The load aggregator, on behalf of prosumers, participates the LCM and reports the self-organized cross-bus trades and corresponding adjustment bids to the LEC for scheduling the use of the network. After receiving the results of locational marginal price and quantity for each buyer and seller from the LEC, the load aggregator recalculates the price for each buyer (24) and seller (25) . It is obvious that the load aggregator can gain extra profit through changing the nodal prices by r t ∈ [0, 1] (23); thus it must be regulated by the regulator through r max (26). 
B. Local Electricity Coordinator
The LEC is responsible for the operation of the network and the LCM which opens to traditional generators, loads, the load aggregator and other communities. The optimization model (27) used by the LEC aims to 1) maximize the social
Equation (28) is the system power balance. Equations (29) and (30) are the line flow limits and voltage constraints, respectively. Equations (31) and (32) are power constraints for traditional generators and loads.
Equations (33) and (34) are the limits for prosumer's generation and demand. Equations (35) and (36) are the limits for the adjustment of self-organized cross-bus trades.
C. Regulator
Present regulatory schemes are well entered in the tradition and history of the electricity industry. The fast technological innovation opens the gates to a multitude of new opportunities in terms of markets, services and related operational strategies, which prompts the needs for a deep revision in electricity regulation and a dynamic update. Models and simulation tools like those proposed in this paper can help this process, providing an "in-vitro" environment for studying and testing possible alternative regulatory choices.
In our framework, the regulator mainly takes two responsibilities: 1) to evoke interests of prosumers to be balanced with the closest sources or in a self-organized way, through different BPs; 2) to monitor the performance of the system and regulate behaviors of other macro-players, especially the natural monopolists in the market. For example, the regulator sets a profit cap r max for the load aggregator when he/she provides services to the prosumers.
V. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we demonstrate the proposed framework of the self-sustainable community through a simulation platform, implemented in Python, based on multi-agents techniques. Fig. 4 presents in a pictorial way, the approach we propose for modelling the EDS as social-technical systems. We show electricity infrastructure in terms of buses and lines (according to the IEEE 33-bus system), and we connect a given number of prosumers at each bus (totally 320 prosumers). For each prosumer we show his/her position on the attitude space that represents his /her physiological attitude and his/her social circle that identifies his/her social interactions. The bidding/offering curves for an equivalent outside community (located at bus 1) are assumed similar to internal traditional generators and loads. To minimize the impacts from nonprosumers' activities, we set r max = 0.01 and t =0. 
A. Impacts of Different Balancing Premium Schemes
It is important for policy decision makers to assess the impacts of regulations and the system responses to them exante in order to devise the best BP schemes for desired system outcomes. The BPs we compared are 0¢, 3¢, 5¢, and 8¢, which account for around 0% to 35% of the average price from the LCM. To focus on the comparison of different BPs, we set ϑ k,d = 1 and ϑ k,g = 1 to eliminate the influence from prosumers' demand-responsive and generationresponsive characteristics. We also compare the results with a reference case in which no social layer is modeled, i.e., the generation and load of each prosumer always equal to the reference values g nk and d nk . In addition, prosumers in the reference case participate directly to the LCM without trying to self-balance at first. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 report the impacts of different BPs on prosumers' demand and generation, with zoom-in views for the quasi-stable parts. As the BP increases, prosumers increase their generation or demand for the self-organized trades to gain more rewards from the BP. As a consequence, both the demand and generation increase (cases of BP = 0¢, 3¢, 5¢). However, after reaching a certain level, the system becomes insensitive to the increase of the BP (case of BP=8¢). According to (6) , (7), the BP can lower sellers' offering prices and increase buyers' bidding prices, then consequently encourages self-organized trades. Therefore, without the BP (BP=0¢), the self-organized trading percentage is the lowest while the LCM percentage is the highest among the 4 BPs scenarios. After reaching a certain value, similar to Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , the BP becomes effectiveless in terms of encouraging self-organized trades of prosumers (Fig. 7(b) to Fig. 7(d) ). It is because with the increase of the BP either demand or generation will firstly reach its maximum that the selforganized transactions hover at some level. After reaching this point, a prosumer seller (buyer) has to sell (buy) the imbalanced energy through the LCM. Yet, the bidding (offering) prices will be too low (high)to be cleared in the market. According to (12) , (15) , the prosumer will change the price quotation next time. In addition, since this prosumer failed in the market thus his/her benefit would not be the maximum among prosumers at his/her bus. Therefore, the social interactions will drive him/her towards the model prosumer in the attitude space.
The weighted market price is in a very narrow band from 22.35¢ to 23.55¢ and less than 1% of energy is traded through it (Fig. 7) . Obviously, as the BP increases, the profit of prosumers rises even when the self-organized trade stops to grow.
Self-supplies and self-organized trades at the same bus meet most of the energy needs; therefore power flow over the network decreases, which results in lower system losses (Fig. 8) . As mentioned before, when BP=0, both generation and load are the lowest in the simulation; therefore the loss is also the lowest. Low cross-bus energy exchange indicates lower power flows over the network, which also implies less demand for infrastructure investment.
B. The Impacts of Prosumer's Inherent Characteristic ϑ
In general, when the market price increases, prosumers lower the demand, and the opposite is true for the generation. However, each individual has his/her own psychological characteristics of price (2), (3) . In order to study the impact of community members' stubbornness and non-economic method to nudge prosumers' behaviors, we design 3 cases under the same BP (BP=5¢) and assume ϑ k,g = 1, 1) 33% of members are sensitive to the price changes, whose ϑ k,d = 1 and the According to (3), the lower ϑ k,d is, the less demand prosumers would decrease when withdrawal price increases; therefore, the more sensitive the prosumers are, the lower the demand is (Fig. 9 ). According to (6) , with lower demand, buyers will increase the bidding prices, which is in favor of the self-organized trade (Fig. 10) . This behavior will then increase the profit of prosumers due to the BP rewards (Fig. 11) . It is manifest that both the self-organized trades and average profit of prosumers grow when the number of responsive prosumers increase. In contrast, the demand and generation decrease when more price-responsive prosumers appear. This is a favorable outcome for the community as the total energy consumption decreases without sacrificing the economic profit of the community members.
As is shown by the simulation results, in order to maximize the advantages of the BP, policy decision makers need to cultivate common psychologies and culture of the community to be more responsive to the policies. Actions such as advertisement, propaganda and transparent information can be useful to bring up the consensus of the community.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emergence of prosumers changes the roles of the end users in the EDS from passively acquiring electricity to actively scheduling the demand and generation according to individual free will. It also makes the local exploration of renewable energy possible, and benefits both players and the system. However, new scenario brings extreme complexities to the study and control of the system. It prompts the needs of new approaches and tools for understanding the EDS, especially for the policy decision makers. Our 4-layerd framework can study the interactive behaviors of the prosumers under the guidance from micro-players.
The emerging smart grid can open a new vision for the operation of power systems, and make it possible to have a self-organized community of prosumers with a brand-new approach. Crucial in the merging framework are the social and technical interactions that affect the global performance and the needs to strive for macro-control of self-interested micro-players interacting at the social and network levels. The regulation can be made with external excitation both in terms of price and social values. Sometimes social values may be more effective than price signals. Our results show that to maximize the effectiveness of the policy, corresponding community culture should be carefully fostered. Our multilayered complex dynamic model is effective in capturing those interactions and in supporting policy decision making.
